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Abstract: This paper examines in broad lines the relations between Great Britain and the Kingdom 
of  Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Yugoslavia) throughout the two interwar decades of  the latter country’s 
existence. The survey shows that Yugoslavia was the most important country in the Balkans and thus 
commanded serious attention of  British diplomacy, since Yugoslav foreign policy had an impact on 
Great Power rivalries in South-Eastern Europe incommensurate with her size and actual strength. While 
Yugoslavia constantly sought security for her borders, the Foreign Office wanted to see her as a pillar 
of  peace and stability in the region. With her permanent troubles with hostile neighbours, most notably 
Italy, and internal tensions, the main of  which was Croat discontent, this was a difficult undertaking for 
the Belgrade government. The Foreign Office had a good deal of  sympathy for Yugoslavia in dealing 
with her difficulties, but it was also highly critical of  Belgrade’s inefficient and corrupt administration. 
In foreign affairs, Britain often took a dim view of  what it perceived as Yugoslavia’s conduct of  foreign 
policy that ran contrary to British policy of  all-round appeasement in South-Eastern Europe and later, 
in the latter half  of  the 1930s, containment of  Nazi Germany. This would eventually lead to British 
involvement in the 27 March 1941 coup d’état in Belgrade which embroiled Yugoslavia in the Second 
World War.
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The Kingdom of  Yugoslavia1 grew out of  Serbia’s victory in the Great 
War on the side of  the Entente Powers, emerging from the ruins of  the 
Habsburg Empire, and constituted perhaps the most complex state in Europe 
in terms of  its ethnic, religious, and cultural make-up. Great Britain was, 
along with France, the arbiter of  European affairs after the war, at least 
until Germany’s revival in the latter half  of  the 1930s. During the peace 
conference in Paris, Britain naturally afforded a measure of  support to the 
Yugoslav delegation, which it essentially viewed as a representative of  the 
allied Serbia; but this support was constrained by the consideration for 
another war-time ally, Italy, with its Great Power status, which was inimical 
to the Yugoslav state from the outset. Italy had territorial designs on the 
littoral province of  Dalmatia, mostly populated by Croats and with only a 
few Italians, and also perceived a large South Slav state as an obstacle to 
its own imperialist ambitions in the Balkans and the Danube region. British 
1 The official name of  the country was the Kingdom of  Serbs, Croats and Slovenes until 
it was changed to Yugoslavia in 1929. However, it is customary and more convenient to 
use the name Yugoslavia for the entire period of  its existence. It should be noted that 
Yugoslavia (in different forms and spellings of  this word, designating the state comprised 
of  Yugoslavs, that is to say South Slavs  with the exception of  Bulgarians) was used even 
prior to 1929.
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Prime Minister David Lloyd George mediated, together with the French and 
American leaders, George Clemenceau and Woodrow Wilson, in the border 
dispute between Yugoslavia and Italy, known as the Adriatic question, to no 
avail  the British and French were bound to respect Italy’s standpoint as 
a result of  their signing the Treaty of  London with Rome in 1915, which 
promised generous territorial concessions to the Italians in return for their 
entry into the war.2 Yugoslavia eventually concluded the unfavourable 
Treaty of  Rapallo in 1920, which resolved the matter of  delimitation with 
her Adriatic neighbour once she had to face it alone, without the Entente 
mediators.3
After the peace settlement had been finally bedded down, Yugoslavia 
emerged as an especially important country in the region. To British policy-
makers, Yugoslavia was the key country in the Balkans and, to a large ex-
tent, in Central Europe, as it acquired the status of  a regional power and 
seemed to have much potential. Such an assessment was predicated on her 
relative size, the number of  inhabitants, natural resources and military ca-
pabilities. For that reason, London paid much attention to Yugoslavia in its 
pursuit of  the main goal of  British foreign policy in South-Eastern Europe 
 maintaining peace and stability. It was Belgrade’s misfortune that much 
of  the regional tensions that stemmed from Italy’s imperialism and the revi-
sionist aspirations of  minor powers such as Hungary and Bulgaria centred 
on Yugoslavia. In addition, Yugoslavia never managed to put her house in 
order and internal difficulties, largely the Croat discontent and separatism, 
presented a standing temptation for external opponents. This gave rise to 
misgivings among a number of  British observers in the early years of  Yugo-
slavia’s existence, who came to regard “a significant revision in the direction 
of  regional autonomy as indispensable to the country’s future as a united 
entity.”4 Belgrade sought support to maintain the status quo in both Paris and 
London, but France was much more sympathetic; hence the close ties and 
the 1927 Treaty of  Friendship with that country. On the other hand, there 
was no question of  any British commitment to Yugoslavia, or any other East 
European country: the pressures of  both foreign and internal affairs, con-
sideration for public opinion and the attitude of  Dominions, and economic 
and military retrenchment all combined to militate strongly against such an 
undertaking. After all, it was with much difficulty and reluctance that Brit-
ain agreed to rather limited commitment to Paris in order to guarantee the 
Pact of  Locarno of  1925 between France and Germany, which was deemed 
a matter of  British national interest.
2 David Lloyd George, Memoirs of  the Peace Conference, vol. II (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1939).
3 Dragan Živojinovi , “Velika Britanija i Rapalski ugovor 1920. godine”, Istorijski asopis, 18 
(1971), pp. 393–416. 
4 James Evans, Great Britain and the Creation of  Yugoslavia: Negotiating Balkan Nationality and 
Identity (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2008), p. 220.
The Kingdom of  Yugoslavia and Great Britain 221
Britain’s attitude towards Yugoslavia, and the Paris peace settlement in 
general, was rather ambiguous, which accounted for less cordial relations 
than Franco-Yugoslav ones. Britain was also doubtful as to Yugoslavia’s  and 
other successor states’  stability and permanence, which was not entirely 
unreasonable in view of  her internal political crises and strained relations 
with hostile and revisionist neighbours. In addition, there was an undercur-
rent of  strong distrust and antipathy in the Foreign Office for Nikola Paši  
and his Radicals, which were often suspected, mostly without foundation, 
of  nurturing expansionist ambitions at the expense of  Albania and Greece 
 designs on Salonica (Thessaloniki) in the latter case. In a similar vein, the 
Foreign Office strongly speculated about the likelihood of  Yugoslavia’s co-
operation with Bulgaria and Italy, despite Belgrade’s troublesome relations 
with these two countries, with the aim of  capturing Salonica. This mistrust 
of  Yugoslavia’s conduct of  foreign affairs was further exacerbated by British 
suspiciousness of  the alleged military interference with policy-making in Bel-
grade, namely the influence of  the so-called White Hand clique of  officers.5 
The exaggerated mistrust in Yugoslavia’s leadership reflected characteristic 
cultural prejudices among the British, tinged with racist undertones, against 
all Balkan peoples and their states  comments made by Foreign Office of-
ficials abounded with remarks to that effect.6
The British attitude towards Yugoslavia’s difficulties with Italy, especially 
Mussolini’s Italy, was of  particular importance – it should be borne in mind 
that this was the most pressing concern for Yugoslavia’s security and foreign 
policy. Although it was Italy that nurtured aggressive plans against Yugoslavia, 
this was not, at least initially, acknowledged in London. The Foreign Office 
found Mussolini’s bombast rather benign, whereas it took a dim view of  Yu-
goslavia’s close ties with France as part of  what was seen as a French security 
system in Eastern Europe. Given the tensions that existed between Rome and 
Paris, the British were inclined to interpret Italy’s bullying of  Yugoslavia as a 
fearful reaction to what the Italians considered a policy of  encirclement on 
the part of  France and Yugoslavia.7 British benevolence to Mussolini’s policy 
was also manifested in the tacit acquiescence to the Italian economic and po-
litical domination over Albania, located at Yugoslavia’s flank, which posed a 
strategic danger to Yugoslavia and was thus bitterly opposed from Belgrade.8 
Britain’s apparent support of  Italy gave rise to suspicions in Belgrade that 
5 For a discussion of  British views see Dragan Baki , Britain and Interwar Danubian Europe: 
Foreign Policy and Security Challenges, 1919–1936 (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), pp. 33–39.
6 For an interesting discussion of  the impact of  abiding stereotypical images on foreign 
policy-making, see Patrick Finney, “Raising Frankenstein: Great Britain, ‘Balkanism’ and 
the Search for a Balkan Locarno in the 1920s”, European History Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3 
(2003), pp. 317–342.
7 Baki , op. cit., pp. 116–121, 164–168; Dunja Hercigonja, Velika Britanija i spoljnopolit ki 
položaj Jugoslavije, 1929–1933: britanska politika prema jugoslovensko-italijanskim sukobima u vreme 
svetske privredne krize (Belgrade: ISI, 1987).
8 Jovan Zametica, “Sir Austen Chamberlain and the Italo-Yugoslav Crisis over Albania, 
February-May 1927”, Balcanica, Vol. 36 (2006), pp. 203–235.
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London encouraged, or at least tolerated, Mussolini’s aggressiveness. The 
Yugoslavs and in particular their Foreign Minister, Vojislav Marinkovi , were 
convinced that Britain’s attitude was a decisive factor in breaking the dead-
lock in relations with Rome. “London is always the goal of  all my efforts, 
whether in Paris, Geneva, Hague, Belgrade or Rome,” he stressed.9 The Brit-
ish Minister in Belgrade, Sir Nevile Henderson, struck a friendship with King 
Alexander Karadjordjevi  and supported fully the Yugoslav point of  view in 
his reports to Whitehall.10 Other British ministers in the interwar era also 
displayed, although not to the same extent, a fairly sympathetic attitude to-
wards Yugoslavia, her people and the diplomatic and political difficulties that 
the Belgrade government faced.11 However, the Foreign Office was not will-
ing to support Yugoslavia in her troubles with Rome: apart from its general 
dislike of  the air of  commitment, especially in respect of  territorial integrity, 
9 Belgrade, Archives of  the Serbian Academy of  Sciences and Arts [hereafter ASANU], 
Vojislav Marinkovi  Papers, 14439/169, Marinkovi  to Raki , 16 December 1930.
10 Nevile Henderson, Water under the Bridges (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1945), pp. 169–198.
11 British Ministers in Belgrade were: Sir Charles Alban Young (1919–1925), Sir Howard 
William Kennard (1925–1929), Sir Nevile Meyrick Henderson (1929–1935), Sir Ronald 
Hugh Campbell (1935–1939) and Ronald Ian Campbell (1939–1941). It is interesting 
to note that, apart from Young who retired after his service in Yugoslavia, other British 
diplomats went on to have distinguished careers after their departure from Belgrade 
and left their mark in history. At the outbreak of  the Second World War in September 
1939, Kennard was the British Ambassador to Poland and later, after the German 
conquest of  Poland, to the Polish government-in-exile, while Henderson became the 
notorious appeaser of  Nazi Germany as an ambassador in Berlin (his successful mission 
in Yugoslavia played a part in the Foreign Office’s considerations to appoint him head 
of  the Berlin embassy). Ronald Hugh Campbell left Belgrade to become the British 
ambassador in Paris, in recognition for what was regarded as his outstanding abilities, 
and remained there until the fall of  France in June 1940. After having completed his 
tenure in Belgrade, his successor and namesake was appointed deputy head of  mission 
in Washington, with the rank of  Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, just 
like in the Belgrade Legation  he was Assistant Under-Secretary of  State at the Foreign 
Office in 1945 and served as the United Kingdom’s Ambassador to Egypt from 1946 to 
1950. See the relevant volumes of  the Foreign Office List and Diplomatic and Consular Year Book 
(London: Harrison and Sons, 1907–1965). For the annual reports on Yugoslavia written 
by British Ministers see Robert L. Jarman, ed., Yugoslavia: Political Diaries 1918–1965, 4 vols 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Archive Editions, 1997), I-III; Živko Avramovski has published 
these reports in the Serbian language in his Britanci o Kraljevini Jugoslaviji: godišnji izveštaji 
britanskog poslanstva u Beogradu 1921–1938. 3 vols (Belgrade: Arhiv Jugoslavije; Zagreb: 
Globus, 1986–1996). The Yugoslav diplomats with the rank of  Envoy Extraordinary and 
Minister Plenipotentiary in the London Legation were: Mihailo Gavrilovi  (1919–1924), 
Djordje Djuri  (1925–1935), Slavko Gruji  (1935–1937), Dragomir Kasidolac (1937–
1939) and Ivan Subboti  (1939–1941). From November 1924 to November 1925 the 
Yugoslav Legation was headed by the chargé d’affaires a. i. Djordje Todorovi . From 26 
June 1931 to 3 December 1931 it was the chargé d’affaires a. i. Božidar Puri  who ran 
the mission. The surviving monthly reports of  the Yugoslav Ministers in London were 
published in Miladin Miloševi  and Miodrag Ze evi , eds, Mese ni izveštaji jugoslovenskog 
poslanstva u Londonu 1930–1941. godine (Belgrade: Eksportpres, 1991). For short biographies 
of  the Yugoslav diplomats in Britain see also Belgrade, Archives of  Yugoslavia [hereafter 
AJ], Ministry of  For eign Affairs of  the Kingdom of  Yugoslavia [collection No. 334, 
hereafter Foreign Min istry], Personal Files.
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there was no true confidence in the 
future of  that country.12 The Brit-
ish perception would change in the 
1930s when the illusions of  Mus-
solini’s allegedly pacifist policy were 
dissipated, but the Foreign Office 
continued to advocate Yugoslavia’s 
detachment from France as the saf-
est means for Belgrade to come to 
terms with Rome. It was only briefly 
during the Abyssinian Crisis, when it 
seemed that Britain might even mili-
tarily confront Italy in pursuing the 
League of  Nations sanctions against 
that country, that Britain sought Yu-
goslavia’s cooperation in a potential 
conflict.13 Unsurprisingly, Belgrade 
was not prepared to expose itself  to 
a full-scale Italian military invasion 
for the sake of  applying sanctions 
against Rome over Italy’s aggression 
in Africa.
On the Yugoslav side, the British reserve and reluctance was duly noted. 
Slobodan Jovanovi , the well-known law professor and historian, told Wil-
liam Strang, a young British diplomat who had just started his diplomatic 
career in Belgrade in the early 1920s: “No allied country, he said, had been 
more generously friendly to Jugoslavia than Great Britain, and no allied 
country politically so hostile.”14 This was an exaggerated claim, but it echoed 
a wide-spread feeling on the Yugoslav, or rather Serbian side, that Britain’s 
attitude towards Belgrade left much to be desired. Other Serbian politicians 
and officials largely understood it in terms of  time-honored and deep-rooted 
notions of  British policy toward the Slav, and particularly Serb, populace of  
South-Eastern Europe. In 1930, Marinkovi  professed to his friend, the Yu-
goslav Minister in Rome Milan Raki , that the British attitude resulted from 
“an innate distrust due to the difference in our characteristics and concep-
tions and long-standing prejudices against our people. For the whole century 
English policy was so orientated that we were always a nuisance whether as 
opponents of  Turkey or opponents of  Austria, or opponents of  Bulgaria. In 
such an old and traditional state that means a lot.”15 Much of  Yugoslavia’s 
12 Baki , op. cit., p. 165.
13 Živko Avramovski, “Pitanje u eš a Jugoslavije u vojnim sankcijama protiv Italije za vreme 
italijanske agresije na Etiopiju (1935–1936)”, Jugoslovenski istorijski asopis, 1 (1964), pp. 13–36.
14 Lord Strang, Home and Abroad (London: Andre Deutsch, 1956), p. 55.
15 ASANU, Milan Raki  Papers, Marinkovi  to Raki , private, 30 December 1930, quoted 
in Dunja Hercigonja, Velika Britanija i spoljnopoliti ki položaj Jugoslavije, p. 47. 
Sir Nevile Meyrick Henderson, British Minister 
in Belgrade (1929–1935)
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fear that British policy might support her opponents stemmed from differ-
ent manifestations of  public backing for the Italian, Bulgarian or Hungar-
ian cause, or for the Croat autonomist and separatist aspirations. There was 
never a lack of  prominent Britons who for various reasons advocated the 
rights of  the alleged Bulgarian minority in Macedonia, rectification of  the 
Hungarian borders, or federalization of  Yugoslavia to satisfy non-Serbs. The 
British press and well-known experts in the Balkan affairs, such as historian 
Robert William Seton-Watson and Henry Wickham Steed, a journalist, of-
ten voiced such opinions. They kept in close touch with the opponents of  
the Belgrade government, be it Croat politicians or Serb opposition leaders, 
and damaged Yugoslavia’s image in British public opinion.16 The vigorous 
campaign of  Lord Rothermere, the owner of  the Daily Mail, for the restora-
tion of  Hungarian borders in 1928 caused a storm of  protest among Hun-
gary’s neighbours; a caucus of  168 members of  parliament that took up the 
Hungarian case for border revision five years later was no less annoying. For 
Yugoslavia, the most harmful were former friends of  Serbia from the time of  
the Great War, who turned against Belgrade whether Paši  was in power or 
King Alexander established his personal rule. This led Božidar Puri , Chargé 
d’Affaires of  the Yugoslav Legation in London, to muse that “English histo-
rians and publicists, [Arthur] Evans, Steed, [Seton-]Watson, were discover-
ing the Austro-Hungarian Slavs and saw the salvation of  Austria in resolv-
ing their problems, a salvation from breakdown by means of  which Russia 
could, as well as by means of  us South Slavs, break out to the Adriatic and 
Mediterranean sea. [They were] friends of  the Austrian Slavs for the sake 
of  Austria, not for the sake of  Slavs.” Although pro-Austrian sentiment had 
been suffocated during the Great War, the inertia of  traditional views, Puri  
believed, according to which Belgrade’s orthodoxy was regarded as “oriental, 
enigmatic and revolutionary,” carried on.17
But although Whitehall was never prepared to provide full and uncondi-
tional support that policy-makers in Belgrade wanted, that is not to say that 
it had no understanding for some of  their difficulties. The Foreign Office 
was more sympathetic to Yugoslavia than to Bulgaria in their dispute over 
the Serbian part of  Macedonia. It found that Macedonian Slavs were nei-
ther Serb nor Bulgarian, as it was claimed in Belgrade and Sofia respectively, 
but it believed that the assimilation of  the Macedonian population within 
Serbia afforded “the best hope of  permanent peace in the Balkans”; it also 
believed that the demand for autonomy by the pro-Bulgarian terrorist Inter-
nal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) was only envisaged as 
the first step toward a union with Bulgaria, which could be considered “an 
16 For example, see the views and activities of  Seton-Watson in Hugh Seton-Watson et al., 
eds, R. W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs: correspondence, 1906–1941, 2 vols. (London and 
Zagreb: the British Academy and the University of  Zagreb, 1976). 
17 Mese ni izveštaji jugoslovenskog poslanstva, No. 2, General Report on the internal and foreign 
policy of  Great Britain for March 1930 (Puri  to Kumanudi, Apr. 1, 1930, confidential 
No. 210).
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almost certain cause of  future conflict.”18 Belgrade was advised repeatedly to 
improve the administration in the southern province as the best means of  fa-
cilitating the rapid assimilation of  the local population. But Belgrade needed 
to secure Serbian Macedonia from IMRO’s outrages and scotch Bulgaria’s 
ambitions to seize its territory, perhaps in conjunction with some other pow-
ers. Since the attempts to reach a rapprochement with Sofia did not succeed, 
Yugoslavia formed the anti-Bulgarian Balkan Pact with Greece, Romania 
and Turkey in 1934  it was also envisaged as a means of  defending the 
Balkan countries from Great Power, mostly Italian, interference. Britain took 
a dim view of  the Balkan Pact, because it wanted to see the appeasement of  
Bulgaria and found the alliance against that country entirely counterproduc-
tive.19 British policy also never supported Hungary’s demands for revision 
of  the Trianon peace treaty which would affect Yugoslavia. Belgrade formed 
the Little Entente together with Czechoslovakia and Romania in 1920–21 to 
keep in check Hungarian  and Bulgarian  irredentism. The Foreign Of-
fice initially welcomed the alliance on the grounds that it could contribute 
to peace and stability in the Danube region, but in time came to see it as 
an obstacle to the appeasement of  Hungary, whose conservative regime had 
become rather popular with the British establishment. It also admitted that a 
certain change in borders in favour of  Budapest would be justified from the 
ethnographical point of  view, but British diplomacy realised that any such 
attempt was bound to lead to military conflict in Central Europe. And that 
was exactly what Britain wanted to prevent. Despite the powerful support 
and lobbying for the Hungarian cause in British public opinion and even in 
parliament, the Foreign Office deprecated the harmful effects produced in 
the Danubian countries and decided to pass over it in silence so as not to give 
it publicity.20
It should also be noted that the British were rather sympathetic to the 
Yugoslav government in their internal problems with the Croats. All Brit-
ish Ministers in Belgrade, as well as Foreign Office officials, were critical of  
Serbian administrative deficiencies, corruption and unduly centralist policies 
that had caused dissatisfaction in Croatia and other provinces. Neverthe-
less, they found the obstinate opposition of  the Croat Peasant Party to the 
Serb-dominated government rigid, unconstructive and practically designed 
to block any compromise between the two sides. On balance, they blamed 
the Croats more than the Serbs for the deadlock in which Yugoslavia found 
herself  for most of  her interwar existence. It is interesting to note that such 
a perception of  the Serbo-Croat controversy was influenced by another in-
terethnic strife that had taken place in the British Isles themselves, namely in 
18 Baki , op. cit., p. 34.
19 Živko Avramovski, Balkanska antanta, 1934–1940 (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 
1986); the same author discussed the British angle in “Stav britanske diplomatije prema 
sklapanju balkanskog sporazuma (1933–1934)”, Radovi Instituta za hrvatsku povijest, 16 
(1983), pp. 139–180.
20 Baki , op. cit., pp. 24–30, 110, 132.
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Ireland. It is perhaps no wonder that British diplomats and officials tended 
to liken the Croat opposition in Yugoslavia with the dogged struggle of  the 
Irish for their independence. This was reflected in a repeated comment that 
the Croat stance was simply “agin the Gov[ernmen]t”, which suggested it 
had no definite and constructive aims.21 Hence the understanding that the 
British showed for Serbian policy-makers in Belgrade. Officially, the British 
were careful not to associate themselves in any way with Croat emissaries 
who lobbied in London for their cause and thus give grounds for complaint 
to the Yugoslav government. The introduction of  King Alexander’s dictator-
ship in 1929, following the tragic shootings in the parliament and the death 
of  Croatian leaders, was also received in democratic Britain with much ap-
preciation for the difficulties of  the Yugoslav monarch and some hope that 
his authoritarian rule might perhaps make some headway where democratic 
methods had failed. However, such hopes soon proved unfounded and the 
British came to consider the King’s personal regime, with good reason, not 
just ineffective, but also a source of  weakness for Yugoslavia  it failed to 
conciliate the Croats and encouraged Yugoslavia’s enemies, mostly Italians, 
to expect and work for her demise.
In October 1934, King Alexander was assassinated during his official 
visit to France by Croat Ustasha, a fascist organization that would go on to 
run the Nazi puppet Croatia formed in 1941. Anthony Eden famously de-
scribed the Marseilles assassination in his memoirs as “the first shots of  the 
second world war”  he had a prominent part in handling the matter in 
Geneva in his capacity as a rapporteur before the Council of  the League of  
Nations.22 This was retrospective wisdom, whereas in reality Britain spared 
no efforts, together with France, to exculpate Italy, which had harboured 
Ustasha terrorists, in order to make possible an agreement between Rome, 
Paris, and Belgrade for the purpose of  safeguarding Austria from Hitler’s 
onslaught.23 This proved to be no more than wishful thinking. But the as-
sassination of  King Alexander was important for Anglo-Yugoslav relations 
insofar as it led to Anglophile Prince Paul’s assuming power as Regent of  
Yugoslavia until the underage King Peter II came of  age. Prince Paul was 
educated in Oxford during the Great War and came to personally know a 
number of  British would-be politicians and civil servants. In fact, many ob-
servers from both countries found him more British then Serbian in outlook. 
In addition, he had close family ties with the British royal house: his wife, 
Princess Olga, and Princess Marina, the Duchess of  Kent, were sisters  they 
were the daughters of  Prince Nicholas of  Greece and Denmark and Grand 
Duchess Helena (Romanov). Prince Paul was friends with Prince George, the 
21 Kew, The National Archives [hereafter TNA], Henderson to Simon, 30 December 1934 
and minutes by Gallop, R 219/219/92, FO 371/19574.
22 Anthony Eden, The Eden Memoirs: Facing the Dictators (London: Cassell, 1962), pp. 108–120.
23 Bennet Kovrig, “Mediation by Obfuscation: The Resolution of  the Marseille Crisis, 
October 1934 to May 1935”, Historical Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1976), pp. 191–221.
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From left to right: The Grand Duchess Helena (Romanov); Prince George, the Duke of  
Kent; Princess Olga and Prince Paul of  Yugoslavia; 
Princess Marina, the Duchess of  Kent; and Prince Nicholas of  Greece and Denmark at 
Bled in July 1935
From left to right: Sir Ronald Hugh Campbell, British Minister in Belgrade; Prime 
Minister Milan Stojadinovi ; and Minister of  the Army and Navy, General Ljubomir 
Mari , at the military airport in Zemun, Yugoslavia, date unknown
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Duke of  Kent, and his brother King George VI from his days in England.24 
Prince Paul was the reason why Anglo-Yugoslav relations in the latter half  
of  the 1930s became more intimate than ever before – or since, for that 
matter; he was referred to as “our friend” in British diplomatic correspond-
ence (or simply “F.”). Indeed, British Ministers were something of  his con-
fidants; he exchanged thoughts with them on all major political issues, and 
even shared with them his intelligence reports. Prince Paul’s prime minister 
was Milan Stojadinovi , formerly connected with British business enterprise 
in Belgrade. Henderson later recorded that Stojadinovi  “owed a good deal 
of  the success of  his political career to me”.25 Since Henderson left Belgrade 
shortly after the latter had become prime minister  and foreign minister as 
well  it seems likely that he alluded to his influence with the Prince Regent 
in appointing Stojadinovi . There is, however, no evidence to confirm the 
claim of  the British Minister. Be that as it may, Stojadinovi  proved to be too 
much of  his own man to be susceptible to any special pro-British or other 
sentiment.
Hitler’s rise and the aggressive German foreign policy heightened the im-
portance of  Yugoslavia for any attempt to contain Nazi Germany in South-
Eastern Europe. The Foreign Office envisaged the formation of  a Danubian 
pact that would gather together smaller countries of  the region under the 
aegis of  France and Italy as a bulwark for the German absorption of  Austria 
and extension of  German dominance to the Balkans. Yugoslavia was regard-
ed as a central link in that prospective agreement, which would cement the 
rapprochement between France and Italy rather than remain the stumbling 
block between the two Great Powers.26 While Britain tried to enlist Yugosla-
via for the purpose of  erecting an anti-German barrier, the Belgrade govern-
ment struggled to preserve the integrity and independence of  the country 
between Germany, which became a neighbour after the Anschluss in 1938, 
and Italy. This was an increasingly difficult task as the German ascendancy 
over the Balkans was growing stronger. The volume of  trade with Germany 
acquired the largest share in Yugoslavia’s exports and imports, which was 
partly a natural state of  affairs due to geographic reasons and their com-
plementary economies and partly resulted from the comprehensive German 
effort to obtain political dominance in South-Eastern Europe. Prince Paul 
and Stojadinovi  were still able to reap some benefits from the fact that Ger-
many and Italy, despite their increasingly close relations, pursued conflicting 
interests in the Danube region. The Italians were afraid that Germany might 
descend on the Adriatic following the inevitable Anschluss and wanted to 
strengthen their hand through a rapprochement with Belgrade. This was the 
rationale behind the Italo-Yugoslav pact of  friendship in March 1937. Italy 
24 Neil Balfour and Sally Mackay, Paul of  Yugoslavia: Britain’s Maligned Friend, 2nd ed. 
(Winnipeg: Canada Wide Magazines &Communications, 1996). 
25 Henderson, Water under the Bridges, p. 172.
26 Baki , op. cit., pp. 132–148.
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dropped its support for the Hungarian and Bulgarian revisionism, promised 
to improve the status of  the Yugoslav (Slovene) national minority and re-
nounced its patronage over the Ustasha organisation  its leader Ante Paveli  
and his supporters were interned on the Aeolian (or Lipari) island, in Sar-
dinia and elsewhere in southern Italy. Yugoslavia also established good diplo-
matic relations with Berlin, which were facilitated by the fact that there were 
no notable issues between the two countries.
Since Britain’s relations with Italy markedly deteriorated after Mussolini’s 
Abyssinian aggression and remained strained despite the Gentleman’s Agree-
ment signed in January 1937, the Foreign Office deplored the conclusion of  a 
pact between Rome and Belgrade. It urged Minister Campbell to exert all his 
influence with Prince Paul to emasculate his Italian agreement, which he did 
to the point of  irritation, albeit without complete success.27 This showed the 
considerable extent to which the British voice was heard in Belgrade, but also 
the limitations placed on British influence. London had no other leverage 
to buttress its diplomatic efforts in Belgrade apart from appealing to Prince 
Paul’s friendship. Despite repeated requests, the British were not forthcoming 
in increasing Anglo-Yugoslav trade which was necessary to prevent Yugosla-
via from becoming fully dependent on Germany, or in supplying armaments 
for the Yugoslav army. The Foreign Office took a favourable view of  assisting 
Yugoslavia in these matters, but this never materialised due to the unhelpful 
attitude of  economic departments and defense priorities that allocated more 
arms exports to countries other than Yugoslavia.28 These realities were fully 
grasped in the Foreign Office where Anthony Eden, now Foreign Secretary, 
lamented that they were asking their minister in Belgrade “to make bricks 
without straw”.29 On the other hand, the Foreign Office was increasingly 
weary that Yugoslavia was sliding to the Axis camp under Stojadinovi ’s pre-
miership in the wake of  the Italo-Yugoslav pact. In reality, the Yugoslav lead-
ers were far from being inclined to the Axis Powers, but they were forced to 
find a modus vivendi with them, especially since it was apparent that they could 
not expect much from Britain and France. British fears peaked during the 
time of  Stojadinovi ’s visit to Rome in December 1937, which was suspected 
of  being a further step in his alignment with the Axis. “We are being double 
crossed, & taking a long time to perceive the fact,” Eden declared, despite 
Campbell’s assurance to the contrary.30 Such anxieties subsided in time and 
27 TNA, Sargent to Campbell, 4 February 1937, R 650/224/92; Eden to Campbell, 25 
February 1937, R 1147/224/92;  Campbell to FO, 21 February 1937, R 1190/224/92; 
Campbell to FO, 24 February 1937, R 1318/224/92; Vansittart to Campbell, 2 February 
1937, R 1340/224/92; Campbell to FO, 26 February 1937, and O’Malley to Campbell, 
1 March 1937, R 1357/224/92, FO 371/21197. 
28 David Kaiser, Economic Diplomacy and the Origins of  the Second World War: Germany, Britain, France, 
and Eastern Europe, 1930–1939 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 177–182.
29 TNA, Eden to Chancellor of  the Exchequer [Neville Chamberlain], R 1494/21/92, FO 
371/21194.
30 TNA, Minute by Eden, 21 December 1937, R 8392/224/92, FO 371/21199.
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Britain remained support-
ive of  Prince Paul and 
Stojadinovi , believing 
that the latter’s govern-
ment had no viable alter-
native. The attempts of  
the Croat leader, Vladimir 
Ma ek, who professed his 
democratic convictions to 
London and Paris, to in-
ternationalise the Croat 
question were ignored. 
Ma ek’s lieutenant Juraj 
Krnjevi  could not estab-
lish contact with the For-
eign Office, despite the in-
tercessions on his behalf  of  prominent figures such as the Duchess of  Atholl 
and Wickham Steed. Whitehall was weary of  allowing him to cause difficul-
ties in its official relations with Belgrade and deplored even the prospect of  
Krnjevi ’s making propaganda in Britain against the Yugoslav government.31
In the summer of  1939 the war in Europe seemed imminent. Prince 
Paul sent his Chief  of  General Staff, General Petar Peši , on a mission to 
Britain and France in July to discuss Yugoslavia’s position and learn what 
he could of  French and British war plans in the Mediterranean. The latter 
assured his interlocutors that Yugoslavia would, although initially neutral in 
the coming war, side with the Allies as soon as they secured control over the 
Adriatic. Prince Paul crossed paths with Peši  on his own journey to London, 
where he enquired about the British capability to defeat the Italian fleet, but 
he received no assurance whatsoever; instead he was to be made a member 
of  the Order of  the Garter. These diplomatic and military exchanges reflect-
ed the fact that the sympathies of  both the Yugoslav government and popula-
tion, especially the Serb people, were overwhelmingly pro-Allied. As further 
evidence of  this, Belgrade transferred the gold reserves of  the National Bank 
to Britain and the United States of  America for safekeeping.32 While Britain 
was engaged in the war against Germany after September 1939, Yugoslavia 
maintained her neutrality until April 1941. But this was a difficult period for 
Yugoslavia as well, since the German economic and political pressure mount-
ed at the time when the German army was invincible on the European conti-
31 Dragan Baki , “Milan Stojadinovi , the Croat Question and the International Position of  
Yugoslavia, 1935–1939”, Acta Histriae, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2018), pp. 218–219.
32 Donald Cameron Watt, How War Came: the Immediate Origins of  the Second World War, 1938–
1939 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), pp. 294–295; Irina Nikoli , “Anglo-Yugoslav 
Relations, 1938–1941” (unpublished PhD thesis, University of  Cambridge, 2001), pp. 
102–103; Zara Steiner, The Triumph of  the Dark: European International History 1933–1939 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 950–952. 
Ronald Hugh Campbell, British Minister in Belgrade 
(1935–1939), October 12, 1935
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nent. The best Yugoslavia could hope for was that the Balkans would remain 
outside the conflict.
Britain appreciated Belgrade’s precarious position and was content with 
Yugoslavia’s neutrality, hoping that the country might eventually join the Al-
lied side. During the Phoney War phase, the Foreign Office confined its ex-
pectations from Yugoslavia to the bare essentials: “resistance by force to Axis 
attack, refusal to make any territorial concessions, and, in particular, refusal 
to permit passage of  Axis troops.”33 Yugoslavia was more than willing to do 
this. It was France, particularly Gen eral Maxim Weygand, the commander of  
the French forces stationed in Syria, who was determined to form a Salonica 
front in the Balkans, which he believed to have potential to contribute, just 
like in the previous war, to the final German defeat.34 The French military 
maintained regular contacts with the General Staffs of  Yugoslavia, Greece 
and Romania for that purpose. The British, however, discouraged Wey gand’s 
schemes: they could have brought about the end of  the Italian non-belliger-
ence which was, in view of  London, a more valuable asset than the vague 
prospect of  a Salonica front.35 Britain instead promoted the idea of  a neu-
tral Balkan bloc, in which Bulgaria would forego her territorial aspi rations to 
show solidarity with her Balkan neighbours and which would perhaps be led 
by the still neutral Italy. With the French military disaster in May–June 1940 
and Italy’s entry into war, both French and British strate gies were put to rest.
It was, however, Mussolini who brought the war to the Balkans with his 
invasion of  Greece in October 1940. His military adventure led to both Brit-
ish and German involvement in the Balkans that would prove critical for Yu-
goslavia. With British land forces and aircrafts employed in Greece, Germany 
was determined to conquer that country and secure its flank before launching 
an attack on the Soviet Union. Germany thus exerted tremendous pressure on 
Belgrade to force it to adhere to the Tripartite Pact in order to facilitate its im-
pending military campaign. Britain was, on the other hand, preoccupied with 
the defense of  Greece, for which the attitude of  Yugoslavia was of  crucial 
importance. In these circumstances, the Foreign Office spared no effort to dis-
suade Prince Paul from signing any pact with Germany. Moreover, the British 
government put pressure on Yugoslavia to enter the war in defense of  Greece, 
even without being attacked by Germany and regardless of  her desperate geo-
strategic situation, military unpreparedness, the uncertain attitude of  the Cro-
ats and the lack of  any prospect to receive aid from Britain. It was even sug-
gested to Yugoslavia to attack the Italians in Albania to help out the Greeks 
and lay hands on Italian military equipment as a substitute for what Britain 
could not provide itself36  long gone were the days when the Foreign Office 
33 Elisabeth Barker, British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War (London: 
Macmillan Press, 1975), p. 86. 
34 Alexandros Papagos, Gr ka u ratu [Greece in War] (Belgrade: Vojno delo, 1954), pp. 51–52, 99, 
105.
35 Barker, op. cit., pp. 11–19; Vuk Vinaver, “Vojno-politi ka akcija fašisti ke Italije protiv 
Jugoslavije u jesen 1939. godine”, Vojno istorijski glasnik 3 (1966), pp. 73–94, esp. 76–78.
36 Barker, op. cit., pp. 78–91.
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discouraged Belgrade from marching into Albania in defense of  its own vital 
security concerns threatened by Italy. It was a measure of  British influence 
with Prince Paul “that from the first days of  September 1940 until the end 
of  the Regency, the Prince received Victor von Heeren ... the German Min-
ister on three occasions, Francesco Mameli ... the Italian Minister not once, 
while he received the British Minister twice or thrice weekly.”37 Nevertheless, 
British military weakness was rather apparent. Without resources to provide 
effective help himself, Churchill tried and failed to organise a new variant of  
a Salonica front which would consist of  Yugoslav, Greek and Turkish forces 
with only a token British participation. For all his abiding affection for Britain, 
Prince Paul was not willing to commit national suicide on advice of  his British 
friends. The realities of  the situation forced Yugoslavia to sign the Tripartite 
Pact on 25 March 1941 to remove the danger of  an Axis invasion. However, 
Yugoslavia succeeded in imposing considerable limitations to her adherence 
to the Axis. As no other country in Europe, Yugoslavia freed herself  from the 
military clauses: she was not obliged to take part in the Axis military opera-
tions and her territory was excluded from the passage of  Axis troops. This 
amounted to de facto neutrality, but Germany found it sufficient with a view 
to securing the flanks of  its troops which were about to descend on Greece 
from Bulgaria. Whitehall was dissatisfied, but it decided that it would be best 
to maintain relations with the Yugoslav government to stiffen its resistance 
to further German demands, but also to explore the possibility of  fomenting 
revolt in the country that could lead to the fall of  the incumbent government, 
if  it became subservient to Germans.38
But only two days later, on 27 March, a military putsch took place in Bel-
grade  that was the decisive event that got Yugoslavia embroiled in the Sec-
ond World War. Britain’s policy and intelligence agencies played a part in the 
coup d’état, but the particulars of  this involvement remain controversial to 
this day. British intelligence services were heavily involved in stirring the re-
bellious atmosphere against the regime of  Prince Paul, as reinsurance in case 
the Regent did not prove amenable to British advice, largely behind the back 
of  the Belgrade Legation. The extent of  the activities of  the well-known Spe-
cial Operations Executive (SOE) has been thoroughly documented, includ-
ing subsidies for the Serbian Agrarian Party, Independent Democrat Party 
and Ilija Trifunovi  – Bir anin, the leader of  paramilitary Narodna Odbrana 
(People’s Defense).39 It is significant, however, that other British intelligence 
37 K. St. Pavlowitch, “Yugoslav-British Relations 1939–1941 as Seen from British Sources”, 
East European Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1978), part II, p. 425. 
38 K. St. Pavlowitch, “Yugoslav-British Relations 1939–1941 as Seen from British Sources”, 
East European Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 3 (1978), part I, pp. 321–324. 
39 Barker, op. cit., pp. 91–94; Filis Oti, “Neki aspekti britansko-jugoslovenskih odnosa 
1941. godine”, in Vasa ubrilovi , ed., Ustanak u Jugoslaviji 1941. godine i Evropa (Belgrade: 
Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, 1973), pp. 89–97; David Stafford, “SOE and British 
Involvement in the Belgrade Coup d’État of  March 1941”, Slavic Review, Vol. 36, No. 3 
(1977), pp. 399–419; Sue Onslow, “Britain and the Belgrade Coup of  27 March 1941 
revisited”, Electronic Journal of  International History, 8 (2005), pp. 1–57. For memoir literature 
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services were also at work in Belgrade, namely the Secret Intelligence Ser-
vice (SIS) and military intelligence which operated through the army and 
naval attachés at the Belgrade Legation. It was the Yugoslav army, or more 
specifically General Dušan Simovi , commander of  the Air Force and the 
new prime minister, and his deputy General Borivoje Mirkovi , the true ar-
chitect of  the plot, who carried out the coup, and they were not among SOE 
contacts. The putschist officers were in touch with the British army and naval 
attachés, and it is this connection that might reveal the full extent of  British 
involvement. But it seems doubtful that crucial records would be declassified 
or have been preserved at all, and the truth is likely to remain elusive. What 
is certain is that the 27 March coup led to the Axis invasion of  Yugoslavia 
on 6 April and that the country collapsed within twelve days and was subse-
quently occupied and dismembered. With the benefit of  hindsight, it is clear 
that the putsch, apart from bringing about a disaster for the Yugoslavs, made 
no difference to the defense of  Greece and the British military effort. Yugo-
slavia emerged four years later on the side of  the victorious Allies, but this 
was now a very different country – a communist dictatorship under Tito  
whereas the strain of  war ruined Britain’s standing as a Great Power.
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